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USING A PHILLIPS CONSTRUCTION
IN ALL PTAB TRIALS: THE IMPACT ON
DISTRICT COURT PATENT ACTIONS
AND PTAB PROCEEDINGS
SARAH JELSEMA, ANDREW MASON, JOHN VANDENBERG
According to a final rule published in the Federal Register on October
11, 2018, the Patent Office will start using the Phillips (contextual ordinary
meaning) standard to construe all patent claims in inter partes review
(“IPR”), covered business method review (“CBM”), and post-grant review
(“PGR”) proceedings that are based on petitions filed on or after November
13, 2018.1 This change may only rarely affect the claim constructions in
these Patent Office trial proceedings,2 but it likely will significantly expand
the reach and impact of those constructions. By using the same Phillips
standard used by district courts, the Patent Office constructions in these
proceedings—particularly once accepted or modified on appeal—often will
be adopted and applied by district courts under principles of stare decisis or
issue preclusion.3
Before this change, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) has
used the Phillips standard in AIA post-grant proceedings only when
construing claims in patents that have expired or will expire before the final
decision deadline, and sometimes, upon request, in patents that “will expire
within 18 months from the entry of the Notice of Filing Date Accorded to
1. Changes to the Claim Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims in Trial Proceedings
Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83 Fed. Reg. 51340, 51340–41 (Oct. 11, 2018); Phillips v.
AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
2. See, e.g., Laura E. Dolbow, A Distinction without a Difference: Convergence in Claim
Construction Standards, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1071, 1085 (2017); Paula Miller, et al., Are There Really
Two Sides of the Claim Construction Coin? The Application of the Broadest Reasonable Interpretation
at the PTAB, 17 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. | PTAB BAR ASSOC. 43, 47 (2018).
3. Other legal principles outside the scope of this article, such as judicial estoppel, may also bind
a party to a claim construction it has previously asserted. See, e.g., SkyHawke Techs., LLC v. Deca Int’l
Corp., 828 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
1
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Petition.”4 Otherwise, it has applied the broadest reasonable
interpretation5—a standard not used in district courts and therefore leading
to constructions unlikely to be adopted by district courts under stare decisis
or issue preclusion.
The Supreme Court in Cuozzo affirmed the agency’s giving unexpired
claims their broadest reasonable interpretation as within the authority
delegated by Congress.6 The Court declined to opine on whether the
Phillips standard would be “a better alternative as a policy matter,” noting
that Congress left this determination “to the particular expertise” of the
agency.7 In its supplemental information accompanying the final rule, the
Patent Office states that using the Phillips standard—as used by the district
courts and the International Trade Commission—“could lead to greater
uniformity and predictability of the patent grant” and “help increase
judicial efficiency overall.”8
In the final rule, the Patent Office has also “added a provision to its
rules under which “the Office will consider any prior claim construction
determination in a civil action or ITC proceeding if a federal court or the
ITC has construed a term of the involved claim previously using the same
standard, and the claim construction determination has been timely made of
record in the IPR, PGR, or CBM proceeding.”9 As it does so, the PTAB
will need to consider whether stare decisis, issue preclusion or principles
akin thereto, apply.
This article briefly discusses the potential impact of these changes on
both district court actions and PTAB proceedings in view of stare decisis
and issue preclusion.10

4. Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Elm 3DS Innovations, LLC, No. IPR2016-00386, 2016 WL 8969948,
at *1–2 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 11, 2016); 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.100(b), 42.200(b) (2016).
5. Samsung Elecs. Co., 2016 WL 8969948, at *1–2.
6. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016).
7. Id. at 2146.
8. Changes to the Claim Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims in Trial Proceedings
before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83 Fed. Reg. at 51340, 51342 (Oct. 11, 2018).
9. Id. at 51345.
10. This article does not comment on or otherwise address potential issues with the wording of the
final rule. See, e.g., James E. Brookshire, Federal Circuit Bar Association Comments on the Proposed
Rule, USPTO (July 9, 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/comment-fcba.pdf.
(identifying possible points of confusion in the language of the proposed rule).
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I. PRECLUSIVE EFFECT OF FEDERAL CIRCUIT DECISIONS ON CLAIM
CONSTRUCTION ISSUES
A. Stare Decisis
A precedential Federal Circuit Phillips claim construction on appeal of
a PTAB, ITC, or district court decision extends to later PTAB, ITC, or
district court proceedings applying the same claim construction standard, as
Federal Circuit claim constructions have nationwide stare decisis effect.11
The Supreme Court indicated in Markman that one advantage of its
decision to treat claim construction as a “purely legal” issue is that it would
“promote (though it will not guarantee) intrajurisdictional certainty through
the application of stare decisis.”12
“Under the doctrine of stare decisis, where a court has in one case
decided a question of law it will in subsequent cases in which the same
question of law arises ordinarily decide it in the same way.” 13 Stare decisis
applies only to precedential opinions.14 The doctrine of stare decisis “is not
rigidly applied, and a court will sometimes overrule its prior decisions.”15
But the Federal Circuit has indicated that it “follows the claim construction
of prior panels absent exceptional circumstances.”16 Therefore, once the
Phillips standard is applied to all PTAB trial proceedings, all Federal
Circuit precedential claim constructions on appeal from such proceedings
will settle that construction for all district court proceedings on that patent
absent exceptional circumstances.
Given the PTAB’s one-year deadline to reach a final decision in AIA
proceedings,17 an AIA proceeding can proceed relatively quickly from
petition to final decision to appeal,18 resulting in stare decisis on claim
construction issues in parallel and subsequent actions and proceedings.

11. See, e.g., Key Pharma. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
12. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996).
13. Ottah v. Fiat Chrysler, 884 F.3d 1135, 1140 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Restatement (First) of
Judgments § 70, cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 1942)).
14. Deckers Corp. v. United States, 752 F.3d 949, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
15. Ottah, 884 F.3d at 1140
16. Id. (quoting Brady Const. Innovations, Inc. v. Perfect Wall, Inc., 290 F. App’x 358, 363 (Fed.
Cir. 2008)); see also Phonometrics, Inc. v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., 21 F. App’x 910, 911–12 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (indicating sanctions would likely be merited if a fourth appeal on the same claim interpretation
were filed).
17. 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 326(a)(11) (2012); Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29 § 18(a)(1), 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
18. Kerry Taylor, et al., IPR Appeals in 2017: The Pendency and Success Rates, LAW360 (Jan. 16,
2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1000442/ipr-appeals-in-2017-the-pendency-and-success-rates.
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B. Issue Preclusion
Federal Circuit Phillips claim constructions—even those in nonprecedential decisions—may be binding in later proceedings involving the
same or related patents under the doctrine of issue preclusion.19 The general
rule for issue preclusion—which is subject to certain exceptions—is that
“[w]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a
valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the
judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between
the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.”20 Issue preclusion
can also be asserted against a party to a prior action by a non-party to that
prior action.21
While different circuit courts of appeal apply different tests for issue
preclusion, the Federal Circuit has indicated that issue preclusion is
appropriate if:
(1) the issue is identical to one decided in the first action; (2) the
issue was actually litigated in the first action; (3) resolution of the
issue was essential to a final judgment in the first action; and (4) the
party against whom estoppel is invoked had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action. 22

With regard to claim construction specifically, it has held that
“judicial statements regarding the scope of patent claims are entitled to
collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent infringement suit only to the
extent that determination of scope was essential to a final judgment on the
question of validity or infringement” and that “such statements should be
narrowly construed.”23 A Rule 36 decision has issue-preclusive effect to the
extent that the decision necessarily affirmed an issue.24 Thus, even though a
Federal Circuit non-precedential decision or decision under Federal Circuit
19. In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (affirming determination by Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences that issue preclusion barred re-litigation of claim construction dispute
decided by district court and affirmed by the Federal Circuit); Nestle USA, Inc. v. Steuben Foods, Inc.,
884 F.3d 1350, 1351–52 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding issue preclusion applied to claim construction of term
in related patent based on prior PTAB decision which had been affirmed by the Federal Circuit); see
also Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Alps S., LLC, 735 F.3d 1333, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“Our precedent
does not limit collateral estoppel to patent claims that are identical. Rather, it is the identity of the issues
that were litigated that determines whether collateral estoppel should apply.”)(emphasis in original).
20. B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1303 (2015) (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Judgments § 27, p. 250 (1980)).
21. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 328 (1979).
22. Innovad Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 260 F.3d 1326, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
23. A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 713 F.2d 700, 704 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
24. Phil-Insul Corp. v. Airlite Plastics Co., 854 F.3d 1344, 1355–57 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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Rule of Practice 36 cannot have stare decisis effect on claim construction
issues, it may have issue-preclusive effect.25
II. PRECLUSIVE EFFECT OF ITC AND DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS ON
PTAB CLAIM CONSTRUCTIONS
The Federal Circuit has held that ITC claim constructions “have no
preclusive effect in other forums,” based on the legislative history of the
Trade Reform Act of 1974.26
This Section discusses how the PTAB may (or may not) be bound—
under issue preclusion—by a district court claim construction, even if that
construction was not appealed to the Federal Circuit or an appeal is still
pending.
The Federal Circuit, in an appeal from a reexamination proceeding,
stated broadly that “the board is not generally bound by a prior judicial
construction of a claim term.”27 In that setting, because the Patent Office
(against whom the prior construction was asserted) had not been a party to
the prior district court proceeding, the basic requirements of issue
preclusion were not met.28
In AIA proceedings, by contrast, the PTAB may be bound to follow a
prior district court construction, to the extent the construction is considered
to be asserted against a patentee or petitioner, as opposed to the Patent
Office. The Patent Office’s unique role in these proceedings, however, such
as its ability to proceed to a final decision even if a petitioner withdraws
and its ability to intervene in an appeal,29 may provide the PTAB with more
flexibility in declining to follow a prior construction asserted against a
petitioner. For example, in Cuozzo, the Patent Office intervened to defend
its decision after the petitioner withdrew.30 Because the Patent Office can
25. Phonometrics, Inc. v. Econ. Inns of Am., 349 F.3d 1356, 1363 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see
Federal
Circuit
Internal
Operating
Procedure
No.
9.8
(Nov.
14,
2008),
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/IOPs122006.pdf (“Nonprecedential opinions and orders
and Rule 36 judgments shall not be employed as binding precedent by this court, except in relation to a
claim of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.”); Federal Circuit Rules of Practice Nos.
32.1(c–d),
36
(Dec.
2017),
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/rules-ofpractice/MASTERFederalCircuitRulesOfPractice-12.1.17.pdf.
26. Texas Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1568–69 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
27. Power Integrations, Inc. v. Lee, 797 F.3d 1318, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing In re Trans Tex.
Holdings Corp., 498 F.3d 1290, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2007)); see also SkyHawke Techs., LLC v. Deca Int’l
Corp., 828 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
28. In re Trans Texas Holdings Corp., 498 F.3d at 1298; see also In re Constr. Equip. Co., 665
F.3d 1254, 1259–60 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
29. 35 U.S.C. § 143 (2012) (right to intervene); 35 U.S.C. § 317 (2012) (ability to proceed without
petitioner).
30. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016).
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play a role in AIA proceedings similar to a party, this may impact the
application of issue preclusion in these proceedings.
The Federal Circuit has not clearly delineated the circumstances when
a district court’s claim construction is accorded issue-preclusive effect.31 In
one case, it held that a district court’s partial summary judgment on claim
construction was not sufficiently final to have issue-preclusive effect in
another district court action where (a) there was no indication an
evidentiary hearing was conducted, and so it was questionable whether the
parties were fully heard on the issues, (b) the district court did not put the
parties on notice that the order could have issue-preclusive effect, and (c)
the record did not show that the district court had entered a final order
approving the parties’ settlement.32
But that decision indicates that at times a district court’s claim
constructions are to be accorded issue-preclusive effect.33 Courts applying
this precedent have reached varying conclusions about the circumstances
under which that occurs. For example, in one ITC case, the administrative
law judge found issue preclusion applied when a district court’s claim
construction was issued in “a Markman opinion based on full briefing,
expert testimony, and a Markman hearing, followed by a summary
judgment order and preliminary injunction where the claim construction at
issue was not appealed.”34 Conversely, in an infringement suit, a district
court declined to accord issue-preclusive effect to another district court’s
claim constructions issued after a Markman hearing, where the other action
was still ongoing.35 As these cases demonstrate, whether issue preclusion
will apply to a prior construction may depend on a variety of factors,
including the status of the prior action and the thoroughness with which the
claim construction was litigated.

31. See, e.g., Powervip, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., No. 1:08-CV-382, 2011 WL
2669059, at *3 (W.D. Mich. July 6, 2011) (“[T]here is an ongoing debate as to the preclusive effects of
a Markman ruling. With little guidance from the Federal Circuit on the issue, district courts have split
on whether a Markman claim construction ruling has preclusive effects in subsequent litigation
involving the same patent, especially where the prior litigation settled before a final judgment was
entered, the ruling has otherwise yet to be applied in a final judgment regarding infringement or
validity, or where the ruling has not undergone Federal Circuit review.”).
32. RF Delaware, Inc. v. Pac. Keystone Techs., Inc., 326 F.3d 1255, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see
Rachel Clark Hughey, RF Delaware, Inc. v. Pacific Keystone Technologies, Inc.: The Federal Circuit
Has Finally Spoken on Collateral Estoppel of Claim Interpretation, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 293 (2004).
33. RF Delaware, Inc., 362 F.3d at 1261–62.
34. Certain Electronic Devices with Multi-Touch Enabled Touchpads and Touchscreens, Inv. No.
337-TA-714, USITC Order No. 16, 2010 WL 4783834, at *5 (Sept. 28, 2010) (Initial Determination
Finding Complainant Collaterally Estopped from Certain Pleadings).
35. Powervip, Inc., 2011 WL 2669059, at *6.
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III. PRECLUSIVE EFFECT OF PTAB DECISIONS AT DISTRICT COURTS
AND THE ITC
A PTAB Phillips claim construction—even if unreviewed by the
Federal Circuit—may have preclusive effect in district courts or the ITC.
The Supreme Court, in B&B Hardware, explained that “[o]rdinary
preclusion law teaches that if a party to a court proceeding does not
challenge an adverse decision, that decision can have preclusive effect in
other cases, even if it would have been reviewed de novo.”36 In discussing
whether a Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) decision could
have issue-preclusive effect, the Court rejected the conclusion of some
courts that “Congress does not want unreviewed TTAB decisions to ground
issue preclusion.”37 The Court found that issue preclusion can arise from
TTAB decisions so long as the issue preclusion requirements are met.38
There is no apparent reason why a different conclusion would be reached
for the PTAB.
In RF Delaware, the Federal Circuit stated that regional circuit case
law governs whether a prior claim construction ruling binds a district
court.39 Thus, although the various regional circuit standards on issue
preclusion are similar,40 whether a district court is bound to follow an
unreviewed PTAB claim construction may depend on that court’s circuit.
A pending Federal Circuit appeal of a PTAB claim construction—or
the ability of an appeal to still be filed—may prevent a PTAB claim
construction from being given issue-preclusive effect. A recent Federal
Circuit case suggests that an IPR decision “became final” for issue
preclusion purposes when it was affirmed on appeal by the Federal
Circuit.41 But, the Federal Circuit has also stated that the pendency of an
appeal of a district court’s decision would not impact the issue-preclusive
effect of that court’s decision on a Merit Systems Protection Board
proceeding.42 In that opinion, the court noted that “[t]he law is well settled

36. B&B Hardware Inc. v. Hargis Indus. Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1305 (citing Restatement (Second)
of Judgments § 28 cmt. a, illus. 1 (1982); Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398
(1981))(emphasis in original).
37. B&B Hardware Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 1305.
38. Id. at 1310.
39. RF Delaware, Inc. v. Pac. Keystone Techs., Inc., 326 F.3d 1255, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
40. See, e.g., Stephen C. DeSalvo, Invalidating Issue Preclusion: Rethinking Preclusion in the
Patent Context, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 707, 710–12 (2017).
41. MaxLinear, Inc. v. CF CRESPE LLC, 880 F.3d 1373, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
42. Rice v. Dep’t of Treasury, 998 F.2d 997, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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that the pendency of an appeal has no effect on the finality or binding effect
of a trial court’s holding.”43
Certain characteristics of PTAB trial proceedings may argue against
giving unreviewed PTAB claim construction decisions issue-preclusive
effect. A PTAB proceeding usually includes no evidentiary hearings or
separate briefing specifically dedicated to claim construction issues,44 the
parties are limited in the arguments they can make by word counts, and the
Board has a statutory deadline to complete its review.45 In addition, claim
construction disputes sometimes only become evident at later stages of
PTAB proceedings, when parties are even more limited in presenting
evidence or argument.46 Consequently, PTAB claim construction rulings
may not provide the “full and fair opportunity to litigate” required to
impose issue preclusion. These and other considerations will lead some
petitioners and patent owners to argue in district court that they were not
fully heard on the claim construction issues.
CONCLUSION
As the PTAB switches to the Phillips claim construction standard in
all trial proceedings, the construction of patent claims in district court may
often be effectively decided by the PTAB—by application of stare decisis
or issue preclusion. But, much remains to be settled on the potential
preclusive effect of unreviewed PTAB decisions, and, in the other
direction, under what circumstances the PTAB will be bound to follow a
district court’s prior claim construction.
This new regime will have substantial practical and strategic impacts.
The expanded impact of PTAB claim constructions may increase the
likelihood of a district court staying an action pending a PTAB trial
proceeding, as the PTAB decision may further decrease the work to be
done by the district court when the action resumes. On the other hand, this
43. Id. (citing SSIH Equip. S.A. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 718 F.2d 365, 370 (Fed. Cir. 1983));
see also, O’Leary v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 1062, 1066 n.6 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting that
unexhausted appeals do not impact the finality of a judgment for issue preclusion purposes); Robi v.
Five Platters, Inc., 838 F.2d 318, 327 (9th Cir. 1988).
44. Some have suggested that the PTAB adopt an early-stage claim construction process, similar
to most district courts, but the PTAB has made no indication that it intends to adopt such an approach.
45. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 42.24; 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11); 35 U.S.C. § 326(a)(11); Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), § 18(a)(1).
46. See, e.g., Ericsson Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLC, Case No. 2017-1521, slip op. at 7–9
(Fed. Cir. Aug. 27, 2018) (remanding for PTAB to consider reply brief arguments regarding certain
claim terms in a proceeding where “neither party [initially] requested construction of these terms, the
Board construed these terms under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard . . . Following
institution, [appellee] argued for the first time in its Response that the claims must be construed under
Phillips” and the PTAB “adopt[ed] these new constructions”).
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change may also significantly decrease the number of PTAB trial petitions
filed. Today, a petitioner generally is free to assert a broad “broadest
reasonable interpretation” in its PTAB trial petition with sufficient
confidence that this breadth will not boomerang against it when denying
infringement in the district court. For example, it is not uncommon for
petitioners in IPR to argue that a broad construction proposed by a patent
owner in litigation is encompassed by the broadest reasonable
interpretation, while simultaneously arguing in district court that the same
construction is improperly broad under Phillips. Or, a petitioner can argue
to the PTAB that a claim term does not trigger a 35 U.S.C. § 112(f)
construction under its broadest reasonable interpretation, but then argue to
the district court that it does trigger Section 112(f) under Phillips. Such
strategies will no longer be available once the PTAB applies the same
Phillips standard as district courts.
In sum, while the switch to Phillips will not affect many PTAB claim
constructions, it promises to significantly affect PTAB strategies and
related district court patent litigations.

